Showing posts with label America. Show all posts
Showing posts with label America. Show all posts

Friday, October 11, 2013

Exploit targeted



In September Microsoft published information about a new Internet Explorer vulnerability – CVE-2013-3893. The vulnerability affects IE versions 6 through 11 for platforms from Windows XP through Windows 8.1. Later in September, the company released a patch closing the vulnerability.
Cybercriminals are happy to exploit such vulnerabilities because they are easy to monetize – the Internet Explorer remains popular.
Top 5 browsers according to http://gs.statcounter.com
This type of vulnerability is very dangerous because it allows the execution of arbitrary code on the target system. In late September, we discovered an exploit for the vulnerability, which uses an attack of the Use After Free type against the Internet Explorer’s HTML rendering engine –mshtml.dll.
We have recently discovered that a modification of the exploit was used in targeted attacks against a number of high-profile organizations in Japan.
The vulnerability is exploited only on those computers which are part of specific subnets of the target organizations’ networks:

Defining subnets in which computers will be attacked
If a computer’s IP address belongs to one of the ranges defined by the cybercriminals, the vulnerability will be exploited after a user visits an infected web page.
The following information is obtained in the first stage of the attack:
Operating system versionInternet Explorer versionLanguage used by the OSWhether Microsoft Office is installed
The exploit selects the appropriate ROP chain and shellcode based on the data obtained in this stage:
Choice of ROP chain and shellcode
It is worth mentioning that the exploit will not work on those Windows 7 systems which do not have Microsoft Office installed.

Checking OS version and whether Microsoft Office is installed
This is because today’s operating systems include mechanisms that make exploiting vulnerabilities more difficult. One of such mechanisms is ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization). The exploit uses a clever trick to evade the mechanism: it loads a module compiled without ASLR support into the context of the browser process – the hxds.dll library.
Code after executing which hxds.dll is loaded
The library, which is part of the Microsoft Office package, does not support ASLR. It is loaded at known addresses in memory, after which the attackers use the ROP technology to mark the memory containing shellcode as executable.
The following shellcode is executed after the vulnerability has been successfully exploited:

It can be seen in the figure above that the shellcode decrypts its main part using 0x9F as key.
After decryption, the code searches for functions needed to download and launch the payload, finding them by their hashes:

Hashes of the functions used
When the search for the addresses needed is completed, the following activity takes place:
a malicious object named “runrun.exe” is downloaded from the attackers’ server:
Downloading the payload
Since the module downloaded is encrypted, the shellcode reads it from disk and decrypts it using 0x95 as key, after which the decrypted module is launched:
Decrypting the module downloaded
As mentioned above, the targeted attack used only one modification of the exploit for CVE-2013-3893. At the same time, the total number of modifications discovered to date amounts to 21. Attacks using this exploit have mostly been detected in Taiwan:

We have the following information on the servers from which the exploit’s payload has been downloaded:
A brief analysis of one of the payload’s variants (md5 - 1b03e3de1ef3e7135fbf9d5ce7e7ccf6) has shown that the executable module has encrypted data in its resources:

Encrypted data in the payload’s resources
The executable module extracts the data and converts it to a DLL module:

Extracting encrypted data
The DLL created by converting the data extracted from the payload is written to disk using the following path:
TempPath\tmp.dll (
md5 - bf891c72e4c29cfbe533756ea5685314).
The library exports the following functions:

Functions exported by tmp.dll
When the library has been written to disk, it is loaded into the process’s address space and the ishk exported function is called:

Calling the ishk exported function
The library itself performs an injection into another process’s address space.
After launching, the malware communicates to a server in South Korea. The following requests are sent from the infected machine:

Requests sent from the infected machine
Kaspersky Lab detects the payload downloaded as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Injector.jmli.
We detect the exploit as HEUR:Exploit.Script.Generic. 

Friday, September 6, 2013

Blog: Jumcar. From Peru with a focus on Latin America [First part]

?Jumcar? is the name we have given to a family of malicious code developed in Latin America ? particularly in Peru ? and which, according to our research, has been deploying attack maneuvers since March 2012.


After six months of research we can now detail the specific features of Jumcar. We will communicate these over the following days. Essentially the main purpose of the malware is stealing financial information from Latin American users who use the home-banking services of major banking companies. Of these, 90% are channeled in Peru through phishing strategies based on cloning the websites of six banks.


Some variants of the Jumcar family also target two banks in Chile, and another in Costa Rica.


Percentage of the phishing attacks by countries

We know that in Latin America the cyber-criminal culture is expanding at great speed. This is evidenced by some of the botnets managed through crimeware developed in the region, which also have the ability to generate customized malware. The botnets we have discovered over the past two years have this capability and we have warned about them at different times. These include vOlk-Botnet, UELP, Chimba-Botnet, AlbaBotnet and PiceBOT.


However, the Jumcar family of malware has completely different characteristics and very particular components compared to those previously mentioned. They share the same goal: to steal financial information; and a common initial infection strategy: email associated with a strong visual social engineering based on false messages.


From a technical perspective, for the moment all variations of this family of malware are developed in .NET, while the usual pattern around malware developed in Latin America (excluding Brazil) is developing malicious projects in VisualBasic.


Likewise, and contrary to common patterns in Latin American malware that obfuscate part of his code through simple hexadecimal conversions, all the Jumcar variants use symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms to hide the functionality specified in the source code. For this, the malware uses the following classes: System.Security.Cryptography.TripleDES, System.Security.Cryptography.Aes y System.Security.Cryptography.RSA.


The images below highlight the difference in the malware obfuscation implemented in the most popular botnets in the region, compared to the obfuscation used by Jumcar:


Example of hexadecimal conversion in the configuration parameters of malicious code propagated through S.A.P.Z., vOlk-Botnet, PiceBOT and AlbaBotnet

Configuration parameters of the Jumcar malware encrypted with RSA

The patterns that distinguish this family of malware are:

Campaigns to spread and infect are always by email. The social engineering strategy is based on the Facebook image in the email message and in the name of the file downloaded (e.g.: facebook.exe). Also in emails supposedly issued by Peruvian banks. The size of the variants does not exceed 44kB. The icons used also concern Facebook in 80% of cases; the other 20% involve icons that hint at a mobile phone company and one percent to the native icon of programming languages .NET and VB. That is, 8 out of 10 samples used a Facebook icon image.

Icons used in the different variants of Jumcar
Once the system is infected, the malware is auto-renamed using names related to Microsoft Windows (e.g.: Windows Defender.exe). The dynamic parameters of the malware are encrypted with algorithms AES, 3DES and RSA. The first variants generated a key in the Windows registry to automate startup, but most recently this has not been the case ? only limited to a "ghost attack" through pharming. Unlike other malwares, it doesn't load a malicious process and delete itself. It will only modify the hosts file. This way, there are no malicious files on the computer, but the user will still be a victim of the phishing attack each time they visit the banking website because of the hosts file modification. The programming language used to create Jumcar is .NET without packing. The malware creates a folder and specific file, in the same folder, with XLSX or DOCX extension. All the websites used for campaigns are compromised using some vulnerability, and the attackers then uses them to store the pharming file, a mass-mailer and a backdoor. The main objective is targeting the Peruvian community.

The propagation campaigns are compatible with classical visual social engineering strategies that rely on sending fraudulent emails, using two different channels of attack:

A message purportedly issued by Facebook with the subject "Facebook Message" (or similar), with the logo of the social network, that direct traffic to file called "Mensaje_Facebook_Privado.php" (or similar), which has the necessary instructions for downloading the Jumcar variant. A message supposedly issued by a major bank in Peru that directs traffic to the clone of the website of the bank in question. This is the classic phishing attack.

Malicious message delivered by email. It is one of the spread strategies used for Jumcar

All variants of Jumcar are hosted on previously compromised websites. In other words, the attacker does not register domain names as part of the strategy of propagation.


They also implant a phishing pack used to steal information from unsuspecting users. This includes a plain text file with the configuration for the hosts file on each of the victim machines, the mass-mailer used to send large volumes of deceptive emails, and a backdoor that allows the attacker to access and upload new variants of the malware.


Jumcar has had a high impact in recent months and has been geographically focused.


Peru and Chile are the countries with the highest rate of infection through Jumcar


We analyzed over 50 samples belonging to the Jumcar family. This allowed us to collect a large volume of data of interest that we will share in the coming days.


The different variants are detected by Kaspersky Lab as ?Trojan.Win32.Jumcar? and "Trojan.MSIL.Jumcar".

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